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 Permanence of Carbon Sequestered in Forests under Uncertainty 
C.S. Kim, J. Lewandrowski, R. Sands, and R. Johansson
1 
Numerous economic studies have demonstrated that agricultural land owners could 
mitigate significant quantities of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by shifting areas of cropland 
and pasture into trees – a process called afforestation  (Lewandrowski et al. (2004), Lubowski et 
al. (2006), McCarl and Schneider (2001), Sands and Kim (2009), and US EPA (2005)). To 
realize the GHG mitigation potential of afforestation it is necessary for some mechanism to exist 
by which farmers can convert increases in carbon stored in trees and biomass to income. Three 
possible mechanisms are the establishment of a carbon market (such as would happen under a 
state, regional, or national cap-and –trade program), the creation of a direct government payment 
for the adoption of specific carbon sequestering practices (analogous to the payments farmers 
receive under USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program), and the development of voluntary 
carbon-related contracts between two or more private parties.    
For afforestation to result in GHG mitigation requires that the associated carbon remain stored in 
soils or biomass for a long time (viewpoints range from 20 to over 100 years).  As an example, 
the Forest project protocol developed by the Climate Action Reserve for use in the California 
climate program requires that reforestation projects occur on lands not in forest cover for the 
previous 10 years and must remain in reforested cover for 100 years (see Climate Action reserve 
2010).  In policy and scientific settings this is referred to as the “permanence” issue. 
  
                                                            
1 All authors are senior economists at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The views expressed are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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 Permanence has a practical implication for the design of carbon sequestration incentives and the 
structure of associated carbon trading frameworks. Specifically, incentives must accommodate 
both the possibility and the uncertainty, that carbon already sequestered and credited within the 
context of a carbon trading framework will be prematurely released at some point in the future. 
Such releases could be unintentional (as in the case of a future fire event or a pest/disease 
outbreak) or deliberate (as in the case of a landowner decision to harvest timber prior to a 
previously agreed on date).  
In the context of a carbon trading framework, the premature release of carbon from a 
parcel of afforested land would likely create an obligation to either replace the released carbon or 
to compensate the buyer - since it would already have been paid for and, presumably, used to 
meet the GHG mitigation commitment of the buyer. Conceptually, the obligation to replace 
carbon released prematurely from afforested lands could rest with either the buyer or seller. We 
assume it rests with the seller because as the land owner, the seller has direct control of how the 
afforested lands are actually managed. Additionally, buyers would largely be entities looking to 
meeting specific emissions reductions targets. If carbon sequestered through afforestation came 
with significant uncertainty regarding its permanence, these entities would likely look to 
alternative suppliers of GHG mitigation or to opportunities to reduce emissions within their own 
operation.  Or the buyer may request that the supplier provide insurance to cover potential losses 
in expected carbon sequestration amounts.  For example, the aforementioned forestry protocol 
for California’s climate program requires that projects build up a buffer pool as a function of 
reversal risk due to probability of fire or pest infestation (Climate Action Reserve 2010).   
   In this paper we examine the issue of permanence in the context of sequestering carbon 
through afforestation. We develop a dynamic nested optimal control model of carbon 
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 sequestration associated with the decision to afforest a tract of land given there are uncertainties 
associated with fire and insect/disease hazards.  Conceptually, these potential hazards are similar 
in that their occurrence at any time t is uncertain and landowners can take specific actions – 
although generally different actions - in any time period t to reduce the probability of sustaining 
losses related to them. The hazards differ, however, in that fire represents a large loss in carbon 
at a moment in time, while insect/disease infestations are more likely to be reflected in a period 
of significant slowing of the rate of carbon accumulation than was anticipated followed by a 
sustained period of slowly decreasing carbon losses. The nature of these losses will influence the 
design of incentives under GHG mitigation frameworks that require carbon losses to be replaced 
as well as the strategies farmers adopt to deal with the uncertainties associated with these events 
occurring.      
 
 Forest Production, Risk Management, and Quasi-fixed input 
Existing dynamic forest products models typically focus on production of timber and 
assume  a point-of-input and point-of-output structure.  Some models have added production of 
sequestered carbon with annual payments to landowners but assume a risk-free environment.  
Therefore, existing models of  timber production need some modification to reflect production of 
carbon sequestration given risks  associated with forest fire and disease/pest outbreaks.   
We start with the model presented by van Kooten et al. (1995) to maximize the present 
value of the timber and carbon sequestration benefits (PVB) over a rotation of length T as 
follows (all variables are explained in Table 1):  
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Our model of timber and sequestered carbon production given risks and uncertainties associated 
with forest fire and tree disease/pest outbreaks is based on several modifications to van Kooten’s 
model as presented in equation (3). 
Following Kim et al. (2011), we assume the time path of carbon sequestration in a newly 
planted forest will follow a logistic growth function (i.e., passing through intervals where carbon 
accumulation increases, sequentially, very slowly, increases at an increasing rate, increases at a 
decreasing rate, slowly approaches and reaches a new higher equilibrium level).  
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 We treat all capital equipment as quasi-fixed inputs (see Epstein, 1981; and Vasavada and 
Chambers,1986) and we use hazard functions (see Kieffer, 1988; Kim et al., 2010) to capture 
uncertainties associated with the timing of fire events and disease/pest outbreaks. We explicitly 
consider the properties at the optimum - of  both the preventive and control measures taken to 
reduce the likelihood of carbon losses related to disease/pest outbreaks and preventive measures 
taken to reduce losses related to fire.  
     Historically, responses to the threat of forest fires have consisted of both preventive 
measures before forest fire evolves and eradication (i.e., suppression) activities once fires are 
detected. Preventive measures include  remote sensing for early detection, satellite and aerial 
monitoring, and controlled burnings. Suppression measures include a host on ground- and aerial-
based suppression systems.   Therefore, we use a modified hazard function approach to capture 
risks and uncertainties associated with the timing of forest fires (Kamien and Schawartz, 1971; 
Kieffer, 1988; Kim et al., 2010)      
  We first define Mi(t) to be the probability that forest fire occurs by time t at the ith site, 
with Mi(t=0) = 0, as follows: 





























 < 0  is the time elasticity of the conditional probability of forest 
fire.  In equation (4), both the probability that forest fire occurs by the time t and the conditional 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2  When one assumes that 
dt
t i X i dY )) ( (
 ≡ Yi(Xi(t+1)) – Yi(Xi(t)), Yi(Xi(t+1)) can be represented by (1+v(t))Yi(Xi(t)), where 
v(t) is the rate of timber growth following the Weibull distribution (see van Kooten et al., 1995). 
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 probability that forest fire will occur during the next year would decline as fire preventive 
measures are adopted. 



















Insect pests and diseases are part of all forest ecosystems.  However, landowners can 
reduce both the likelihood of incurring a pest/disease outbreak at a given point in the future and 
the damage done to standing trees if an outbreak does occur by implementing various preventive 
measures (these include selecting pest/disease resistant seeding and prophylactic spraying and 
other treatments to discourage pests and diseases from taking hold).  We define Ni(t) to be the 
probability that discovery of tree disease or insect has occurred by time t, with Ni(t=0) = 0, at the 
ith site and presented as follows: 
(6)  Ni(t) = 1 – exp[– t,     ni(E (t=0)) = 0,     ))] ( ( t E
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 < 0 is the time elasticity of the conditional probability of 
discovering forest disease / insects.  Equation (6) states that the adoption of the preventive 
measures reduces the probability of discovering forest disease/pest at time t and the conditional 
probability of discovering forest disease/pest during the next year would decline as the adoption 
of the preventive measures increases.  
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 is the probability density function of the time for first discovery of a disease or 
pest.  
   Once disease/pest is discovered in a tract of forest, landowners can implement control 
measures, (i.e., E (t)), to reduce damages from diseases (e.g., more aggressive spraying and 
removing infected and nearby trees).  Populations of pest and disease species are assumed to 
follow a logistic growth function (Eiswerth and Johnson, 2002; Huffaker and Cooper, 1995).  
When control measures are implemented, we adjust logistic growth function of pest/disease 
population as follows (Kim et al., 2007): 
a
i
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> 0  for i = 1, 2, . . . , l.    
It should be emphasized that risk or uncertainty associated with forest fire and tree 
disease/pest differs in modeling carbon sequestration through afforestation.  While diseases and 
insects gradually slow down and then reduce the production of both timber and sequestered 
carbon, fire results in a large instantaneous destruction of timber and release of sequestered 
carbon.   
Finally, our tree production function includes the variable inputs, Xi(t), and the quasi-
fixed input, Ki(t), given that the investment, Ii(t), such that the marginal timber product of 
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 investment is negative to reflect the adjustment costs associated with the investment (Epstein 
1981).  The rate of increase of quasi-fixed input (i.e., capital stock) over time is represented by: 
(9)  ) ( ) (
) (






,    K(t) > 0, 
where ε is the rate of depreciation.  
 
The Model 
The net economic benefits resulting from timber production and carbon sequestration 
vary depending largely on whether forest fire occurs, whether tree diseases spread, and whether 
farmers purchase hazard insurance(s) for forest fire and/or tree diseases.  We assume that 
financial compensation to a landowner, in the case of a forest fire event, depends exclusively on 
whether a landowner purchased fire insurance policies.  Table 2 shows profits in any given year 
under 10 different scenarios.  The profit function for timber production and carbon sequestration 
through afforestation, which incorporates the quasi-fixed input and risk associated with forest 
fire and tree disease is then represented by a nested optimal control model as follows:  
(10) J(w, Pi, r, S, F, E
b, E
a, R, K0) =  [(1 – Ni(t))[((1-r)Pi+Si)Yi 
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i (t)) – θiC1(fi) – i φ C2(ei) + ( i φ – 1)d2 + i φ [((1-r) Pi 
+ Si) Yi(Xi(t), K(t), I(t)) – (Pi+Si)Yi(Xi(t-1), K(t-1), I(t-1))  – w′Xi(t)])] + Mi(t)[θi [((1-
r)Pi+Si)Yi(Xi(t), K(t), I(t)) – (Pi+Si)Yi(Xi(t-1), K(t-1), I(t-1))  –  w′Xi(t)  – C1(fi)] + (θi – 
1)d1]) –  R′(t)I(t)}dt + V(K,T). 
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 The profit function in (10) is maximized subject to the state equations in (5), (7), (8), and (9).  
The Hamiltonian equation is then represented as follows: 
 (11)  H = e
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where, the preventive measures adopted per acre to prevent forest fire (Fi ),  the preventive 
measures adopted per acre to prevent forest diseases (E
b
i ), the control measures adopted per acre 
to control tree diseases after the first discovery (E ), and per-acre capital investment (Ii) are 
control variables;  the variable inputs, Xi , are decision variable; the probability of forest fire 
occurrence, Mi(t), the probability of discovery of fungal diseases or insects, Ni(t), the acres 
infested by fungal diseases or insects, ai(t), and quasi-fixed inputs, K(t), are state variables; and λi 
(i = 1. . , 4) are adjoint variables associated with the state Mi(t), Ni(t), ai(t), and K(t), respectively.  
The necessary conditions for optimum are presented in Appendix A. 
a
i
  The economic properties of the optimal conditions for control variables presented in 
equations (A1) through (A4) in Appendix I are better served by investigating the adjoint 
variables λi (i = 1. . , 4).  Since there are many time-varying variables in the differential equations 
(A6) through (A9), it is very difficult, if not impossible, to solve these equations for the adjoint 
variables.  Alternatively, the adjoint variables λi(t) (i = 1. . , 4) measures the marginal effects 
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 (i.e., shadow values) of the state variables, Mi(t), Ni(t), ai(t), and K(t), respectively, on  the profit 
function in equation (10).  By differentiating the objective function J in equation (10) with 
respect to the state variables, Mi(t), Ni(t), ai(t), and K(t), respectively, as shown in Appendix B, 
we obtain the followings: 
(12-1)  λ1(t) <  0;  (12-2)   λ2(t) <  0;  (12-3)   λ3(t) < 0;  (12-4)   λ4(t) > 0. 
As the probability that forest fire occurs in year t increases, the net economic benefits would 
decline so that the adjoint variable λ1(t) is expected to be negative.  Similarly, as the probability 
of discovering acres infested with tree diseases increases, the net economic benefits are expected 
to decline so that the adjoint variable λ2(t) is expected to be negative.   As the acres infested with 
tree diseases increase, the net economic benefits would be reduced so that the adjoint variable 
λ3(t) is expected to be negative.   Meanwhile, an increase in quasi-fixed inputs (i.e., capital 
stocks) would increase the net economic benefits, and therefore, the adjoint variable, λ4(t), 
associated with capital stock is expected to be positive.  Results in equation (12) also indicate 
that it is more beneficial for land owners to allocate more resources for the preventive measures 
to protect trees from diseases than to protect from infestation of tree diseases.     
The optimality condition (A1) indicates that the marginal net benefits from the reduction 
in the forest-fire hazard rate by adopting preventive measures equal the marginal costs (shadow 
values) of adopting forest-fire preventive measures.  Equation (A2) indicates that the marginal 
net benefits from the reduction in the tree disease hazard rate by adopting preventive measures 
equal the marginal costs (shadow values) of adopting tree disease preventive measures before 
tree diseases spread.  Equation (A3) explains that the marginal costs of adopting control 
measures after discovery of tree diseases equal the marginal benefits resulting from the reduction 
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 of the infested acre’s intrinsic growth rate.  Equation (A4) indicates that the shadow values of 
capital equal the sum of the expected adjustment costs and rental value of capital stock.  Finally, 
equation (A5) indicates all variable inputs are used up to the point where the expected marginal 
value products of each input equal its unit price. 
Carbon Sequestration 
  Given carbon credit payment for afforestation, an important question is how much carbon 
will be sequestered at the end of the terminal time (T) under various scenarios.  Following van 
Kooten et al. (1995), the quantity of carbon sequestration during the planning horizon in risk-free 
environment (qT) is given by:  
(13)  qT  =    dt t I t K t X Y t I t K t X Y A i i i i i
T
i ] [ )) 1 ( ), 1 ( ), 1 ( ( )) ( ), ( ), ( (
0
− − − − ∫ α
where αi is tons of carbon per volume of timber biomass at the ith site.  When the forest fire and 
tree disease hazards are considered as shown in equation (10), the quantity of carbon sequestered 
during the planning period (QT) is represented by: 













Comparing equations (13) and (14), the quantity of carbon sequestration which contributed to the 
risks associated with forest fire and tree disease hazards is represented by: 
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which is positive.  Equation (15) indicates that the quantity of carbon sequestration through 
afforestation would be overestimated if risks associated with forest fire and tree diseases are not 
considered in the model.  As the probability that forest fire occurs in year t approaches 
one (i.e., Mi(t) = 1) in equation (15), the quantity of carbon sequestration 
overestimated equals the entire carbon sequestration, when risk and uncertainties 
are not considered, as presented in equation (13).  When the risk associated with 
tree disease infestation is not considered, meanwhile, overestimation is less than 
those in the case with forest fire hazard.  These results are expected because the 
quantity of carbon sequestration is reduced as trees are infested with diseases, 
while all carbon sequestered is wiped out by forest fire. 
Conclusions 
Our research addresses two issues largely neglected in the modeling of land use change to 
afforestation for carbon sequestration: (1) capital equipment is an important determinant of 
changing land use to afforestation; and (2) the effects of tree disease, insects, and fire hazard on 
the net carbon sequestration.  Results indicate that the net economic benefits and the quantity of 
carbon sequestration through afforestation would be overstated if risks associated with forest fire 
and tree diseases, as well as quasi-asset fixity, are not considered in the model.  Indeed, such 
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 contributions are included in recent protocols for eligible carbon offset projects in the case of 
California’s climate program, but heretofore, the theoretical model that might allow a 
comparison of the comparative statics has been lacking.  Future research might well link the 
concept and empirical applications for a region. 
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 Table 1.  Variable Description. 
Y    The volume of timber growing on a stand. 
P    The per unit price of timber. 
X    A vector of inputs. 
S    Carbon payment per unit of tree volume. 
T   Terminal  time. 
r    The rate of discount. 
M(t)    The probability that forest fire occurs by time t. 
F(t)   Preventive/suppression  measures  adopted before the forest fire occurs.   
m(F(t))    The conditional probability that forest fire will occur during the next time unit,   
given that forest fire has not occurred at time t. 
N(t)    The probability that discovery of tree disease or insect has occurred by time t. 
E
b    Preventive measures adopted before the first discovery of tree disease or insect. 
E
a    Control measures adopted to reduce damages from tree diseases. 
n(E
b(t))    The conditional probability that discovery of tree disease or insect will occur during the next time unit, given  
    that disease has not been discovered at time t.  
a(t)    acres covered by tree disease in time t. 
Ai    Acres with the ith-site characteristics. 
g    The growth rate of pest population. 
k    A fractional coefficient. 
Y*    The tree production at the presence of tree diseases. 
K   Capital  stock. 
I   Investment. 
Cb    Costs for adopting preventive measures to protect forest from fire and disease. 
Ca    Costs for adopting preventive measures to protect forest from fire and adopting control measures  
    to control tree diseases after discovery of tree diseases.      
C1(f)   Yearly  amortized  forest fire insurance premium. 
C2(e)    Yearly amortized forest disease insurance premium. 
θ     Dummy variable such that θ =1 if forest fire insurance is purchased and θ = 0 otherwise. 
φ     Dummy variable such that φ =1 if tree diseases and φ = 0 otherwise. 
 d1    Payback of carbon payment when carbon sequestered is released to atmosphere by forest fire. 
 d2    payback of carbon payment when carbon sequestered is released to atmosphere by tree diseases. 
V    Salvage value of heavy equipments. 
U(T)    Costs associated with timber harvest and replanting trees at the terminal time, T.
15 
 Table 2.  Net economic benefits in year t under alternative scenarios. 
 
M    N   θ    φ     Net  Economic  Benefits 
 
1      0     1     0       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t)  – C1(fi ) – R′(t)I(t) 
1      0     0     0       – d1 – R′(t)I(t) 
0      1     1     1       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t) – Ca(Fi(t), E i (t)) – C1(fi ) – C2(ei)  – R′(t)I(t) 
a
0      1     1     0       ((1-r)P
*
i  +s)Yi(t) – (P
*
i +s)Yi(t-1) –  w′X i (t) – Ca(Fi(t), E i (t)) – C1(fi ) – d2 – R′(t)I(t) 
* a
0      1     0     1       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t) – Ca(Fi(t), E i (t)) – C2(ei)  – R′(t)I(t) 
a
0      1     0     0       ((1-r)P
*
i  +s)Yi(t) – (P
*
i +s)Yi(t-1) – w′ X i (t) – Ca(Fi(t), E i (t)) – d2 – R′(t)I(t)  
* a
0      0     1     1       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t) – Cb(Fi(t), E i (t)) – C1(fi ) – C2(ei)  – R′(t)I(t) 
b
0      0     1     0       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t) – Cb(Fi(t), E i (t)) – C1(fi ) – R′(t)I(t) 
b
0      0     0     1       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t) – Cb(Fi(t), E i (t)) – C2(ei)  – R′(t)I(t) 
b
0      0     0     0       ((1-r)Pi+s)Yi(t) – (Pi+s)Yi(t-1) – w′Xi(t) – Cb(Fi(t), E i (t)) – R′(t)I(t) 
b
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– w′Xi(t) – Cb(Fi(t), E




 ai(t)) – (P*
i +Si)Y *
i (X *
i (t-1), K(t-1), I(t-1), ai(t-1)) – w′X *
i (t)] – Ca(Fi(t), E (t)) – θiC1(fi) –
a
i
i φ C2(ei) + ( i φ – 1)d2 + i φ [((1-r)Pi+Si)Yi (Xi(t), K(t), I(t)) – (Pi+Si)Yi(Xi(t-1), K(t-1), I(t-1)) – 
w′Xi(t)])]}. 
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1 = 0 ,      2 = 0 ,     3 = 0.    
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2  < 0. 











3  < 0. 









4  > 0. 
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